This study investigates the impact of corporate governance effectiveness on the market stock liquidity. It is innovative, since we study, on an order driven market, the global effect of corporate governance and then a different governance compounds on the liquidity and asymmetric information, in the French context where this latter is exacerbated considering the presence of insiders (family, majority shareholders, and institutional investors) combined with a weak protection of minority interests.
I. INTRODUCTION
In this paper we examine how the corporate governance effectiveness affect stock market liquidity. Several recent studies as the pioneer work of Edmans (2009) has proved that market liquidity is closely sensitive to blockholders trading. In fact, the blockholders monitoring induce managers to undertake efficient real investment through their informed trading of the firm's shares. These findings suggest that blockholders can exert governance even if they cannot intervene in a firm's operation. Another seminal work of Edmans et al. (2013) empirically test the relation between the stock market liquidity and the monitoring of firms by the blockholder on the basis of the channel of exit (trading). This research confirms that liquidity leads to an overall increase in both voice (intervention of the blockholder) and exit, thus such an improvement is beneficial to the effectiveness of the corporate governance.
These recent researches highlight the extent of the interplay that exist between market liquidity and corporate governance.
In contrast with the above studies that focus on the impact of more liquid market on the strengthening of corporate governance, our study is rather concerned with the differences in liquidity due to the internal monitoring of the corporate governance mechanisms.
Astonishingly enough, this relation has not been yet well studied by financial literature (BarYosef and Prencipe, 2013) . Moreover, despite the existing theoretical literature analyzing the potential effect of corporate governance on liquidity, few papers have addressed this debate empirically.
This paper aims to study the effect of corporate governance mechanisms while addressing the above challenges.
We address the first challenge by focusing on the case of a narrower investor protection country. The role of the internal mechanisms of corporate governance is important due to the lack of the external monitoring effectiveness of the firm. In this case, we suppose that the quality of the corporate governance enhances transparency in both operations and financial markets, specifically in markets with a supremacy of a concentrated ownership. To our knowledge, the empirical relation between internal corporate governance and stock market liquidity has not yet been established in a country with a narrower protection of investors. The examination of this relation is essential to reveal how corporate governance affects shareholder wealth.
Finally, we deal with the second challenge to capture the effect of corporate governance on liquidity by adopting different measures. Initially, corporate governance is measured using a calculated governance index to capture its global effect on liquidity. Then to better explore the impact of different corporate governance determinants separately, we test a set of corporate governance sub-indexes on the different retained measures of liquidity.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the theoretical framework of the relationship between the mechanisms of governance and the stock market liquidity. Section III describes the sample and the empirical methodology. Section IV reports and discusses the results. The last section concludes the study.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
This section lays out our theoretical framework in which we explore different set of theories that explain the relation between corporate governance and liquidity.
According to Edmans et al. (2013) few empirical evidence treat the above relationship. In general, it is supposed by the literature that the mechanisms of governance may improve the stock market liquidity of companies. This current of research is usually based on theoretical foundations such as the agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) , the theory of entrenchment (Shleifer and Vishny, 1989) and the stewardship theory (Davis et al., 1997) .
These theories justify the relationship between the modes of governance and asymmetric information.
The theoretical work of Gillan (2006) provides a broad overview of these issues and recent work in the area. The authors review the main prior research on the impact of corporate governance on liquidity and examine how the investor protection affect stock returns and firm value. For example, several studies examine the relation between the regulatory environment and liquidity utilizing a cross country approach (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997 , La Porta et al., 2000 , Chhabra et al., 2009 . Using a basic definition of liquidity, the cited research considers that poor liquidity is nothing but the consequence of poor shareholder protection. Applying a comparative approach on the Hong Kong market, Brockman and Chung (2003) empirically test the relation between investor protection and firm liquidity. The authors find out that Hong Kong-based equities exhibit narrower spreads and thicker depths which was not the case of their China-based counterparts. Their results show that firm liquidity is significantly affected by investor protection.
Figure 1 -Corporate governance and market stock liquidity
Recently, some researchers believe that the existing relation between liquidity and corporate governance may exist in the reverse order. For example, Edmans (2009) argue that liquidity and governance may be jointly determined by firm's unobservable characteristics, or the causality may run from governance to liquidity. Chung et al. (2010) find that large investors have increasingly supported measures that improve internal corporate governance because such measures also improve stock market liquidity (the exist less costly). In this case, it is important to recall that a system of efficient corporate governance raises the investor confidence in the markets, and furthers the establishment of more stable investment flows in the long run. This is a lever for establishing a relationship of trust between the company and investors, attracting new investors, and improving Market liquidity.
In practice, the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on market stock liquidity is generally explained, in researches, by the risk of an adverse selection that may confront an investor in a context of asymmetric information (Glosten and Milgrom, 1985) . Bolton and Thadden (1998) describe that liquidity increase the incentive of large shareholders to trade on inside information rather than monitor. They show that this trade-off is related to the firm characteristics and operating environment. According to the investors' vision, the only + + -guarantee of the accuracy of the disclosed information is effective corporate governance (Chung et al., 2010) . In fact, several researchers state that this concept makes it possible to potentially reduce the information asymmetry. Conflicts of interests between managers and shareholders, the possibility of expropriation of minority shareholders, and embezzlement, are thus weakened. Consequently, fewer opportunities will be available to allow informed agents who take advantage of private information, at the expense of uninformed agents. Therefore, the uninformed agents will find no interest in broadening the adverse selection component of the spread and reducing share liquidity (Karmani and Ajina, 2012) .
In general, the existing literature on the association between corporate governance and stock market liquidity suggests that the liquidity measure are correlated positively with the effectiveness of the corporate governance mechanisms. For example, Charoenwong et al.
(2011) are among the rare ones to have studied empirically the effect of the quality of governance on the price spread, and this, in the context of Singapore. They measure corporate governance by several criteria as discipline, transparency, independence, accountability, responsibilities, fairness, and social awareness. The authors observe that these studied mechanisms of corporate governance have an inverse relationship with the information asymmetry component (adverse selection). However, only the transparency dimension exhibits a significant inverse relationship with adverse selection.
Recently, Bar-Yosef and Prencipe (2013) study jointly the effects of corporate governance mechanisms and earnings management on market liquidity. They find that, in a country characterized by high ownership concentration, better corporate governance mechanisms tend to improve market liquidity in terms of both Bid_Ask measure and volume of trade. However, the authors notice that Bid_Ask measures are unaffected by earnings management, while trading volume increases when earnings management is higher, presumably due to an increase in investor disagreement.
Theory consequently suggests, in most cases, that corporate governance weakness may influence stock market liquidity. According to Chung et al. (2010) , liquidity is impaired since poor governance is associated with low financial and operational transparency. Therefore, we examine the effect of corporate governance on liquidity using an index of governance attributes that are likely to affect firm's liquidity. This proxy of corporate governance is more effective than to study corporate governance mechanisms independently (e.g., board independence and CEO-chairman separation for the seminal work of Bar-Yosef and Prencipe (2013)).
III. DATA AND METHODOLOGY
In this section we discuss our data sources, variable measurement and the methodology used in the study. 
Data sources and variables measurement

A. Corporate governance index
In order to test our hypothesis, we go beyond the fragmented analysis context which has so far been applied on the governance mechanisms; mechanisms that have been dealt with separately to undertake an even more systematic analysis (Charreaux, 1998) . This analysis is related to the study of the whole set of the inter-connected control mechanisms (Brown and Caylor, 2006) . In fact, the corporate governance evaluation based on dimensions, undertaken separately, could not grasp the global effect of governance and its real relation to the market liquidity (Bhagat and Bolton, 2008) . Consequently, it is advisable to adopt a systematic approach which relies, at the same time, on the examination of several mechanisms as each one of them has an impact on the global efficiency of control (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996) .
In this way, the complementarity stands as a necessary condition to claim the quality of governance. Furthermore, to evaluate the quality of governance and their investment choices, the potential investors along with the market are more concerned with the efficiency of the whole set of mechanisms rather than with a single attribute (Chung et al., 2010) .
Several rating agencies set the tone in terms of the evaluation of the quality of the corporate governance system. Within this analytical framework, Standard & Poor's (2002) have launched a specific rating system in the field of corporate governance. The « Corporate Governance Score » expresses the agency opinion on the governance principles adopted by the firm; and most specifically on how they are applied. These principles are the synthesis of international policies and the actual governance procedures. For S&P, the governance quality could be studied according to four themes; namely the ownership structure and its concentration, the nature of relationship between the different actors, the structure and functioning of the board of directors. The score is the result of the calculation based on the detailed analysis of the management reports and other documents of the company. Plus, similarly to the classical rating methods, interviews with the executives of the firm are put in place. The score is based on a range of 1 to 10, from the lowest score CGS-1 to the highest one CGS-10 (Bradley, 2004) .
There is another well-known metrics of corporate governance that exist. For example, the Gompers et al. (2003) index is designed with a large set of governance requirements into an index which proxies for the strength of shareholder rights, and then study the empirical relationship between this index and corporate performance.
Similarly, the Institutional Shareholders Service (ISS), in 2003, developed a governance index which take into account the 61 variables using four independent dimensions: board, compensation/remuneration, shareholder rights, and audit. Nowadays, The ISS index is composed by 181 factors analyzed under a Governance index, with the specific factors under analysis varying by region.
In our study, we use the governance index to measure the quality of governance system as a whole. The idea that underlies the creation of this index is sort of grasping the governance multiple dimensionality as well as shedding the light on the degree of the corporation compliance to the codes of best practices.
The index includes internal and external corporate governance mechanisms. It was created with regard to the criterion adopted in Bouton's report which were selected by the rating agency S&P and developed by (Brown and Caylor, 2006) study. We selected 82 items 1 , distributed around four themes namely: The board of directors (31 items), the audit quality (17 items), the ownership structure (16 items) and the disclosure of information (18 items) (see Appendix). The sum of marks attributed to each item divided by the total number of items serves as an index of the quality of corporate governance.
B. Liquidity measures
The theory proposes a plurality of measures for the market liquidity. These measures depend mainly on certain priorities. These latter reflect three dimensions namely the volume, the time and the price (Demsetz, 1968) . Currently, the multiplicity of the evaluation methods used in the literature 2 confirms the difficulty to determine the liquidity practical measure that combines these dimensions (the market efficiency coefficient, ratio illiquidity, the profundity, the trading volume and the bid ask spread). This research is based on three liquidity measures:
the price spreads (quoted and effective), the trading volumes and Amihud (2002) illiquidity ratio.
-The bid-ask spread is a measure of liquidity of firms' securities which was proposed by Demsetz (1968) . A practical measure of stock market liquidity combines all of its dimensions (volume, time and price). As bid-ask spread increases the market is likely to be less liquid. The bid-ask spread addresses the adverse selection problem that arises from transacting in firm shares in the presence of asymmetrically informed investors. Less information asymmetry implies less adverse selection, which implies in turn a smaller bid-ask spread and high liquidity (Handa et al., 2003) . We choose quoted and effective spreads as two liquidity proxies. The quoted spreads are the posted costs of the market, while the effective spread is used to capture the transaction costs (Callahan et al., 1997) . Heflin et al. (2005) suggest that effective spreads are likely to be a better spread-based measure for the liquidity of stocks than either raw or relative spreads. In an order-driven market, ask is the best price associated with a selling limit order, whereas, bid is the price associated with a buying limit order. Hamon, 1997 ; Kyle, 1985 ; Acharya et Pederson, 2005 ; Sadka, 2006 ; Demsetz, 1968 ; Edwards et al. 2007 Effective Relative Spread Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) and Chae (2005) studied the informational value of trading volume. Unlike the bid-ask spread, this measure is an increasing liquidity function. Therefore, the higher the trading volume is, the more liquid the market is (Hamon and Jacquillat, 1992 ).
-Asset non-liquidity: is based on the relationship between the performance and the volume as defined by Amihud (2002) . It takes into account two dimensions of the market liquidity: depth, i.e. the volume of units that can be traded without significantly impacting prices, and resilience, i.e. the speed with which fluctuations due to transactions disappear. For one asset class, the mean illiquidity ratio is defined by Hasbrouck (2002) assumes that this measure is the best one to capture Kyle's lamba. This measurement is based on the days without price changes, which is an advantage. This ratio is positively associated with the bid-ask spread; a small bid-ask spread is linked with a limited impact on prices (Lesmond, 2005) .
C. Control variables
The theoretical and empirical literature has put into evidence the fact that the market liquidity depends on other variables than governance mechanisms namely, one of our study's concerns, the variables of interests. These variables reflect the specific characteristics of shares such as the trading volumes, price volatility, share price, the company size and the quoted market value.
Trading Volumes : The relationship between the trading volumes and liquidity is ambiguous. Hand et al. (1992) and Back and Pedersen (1998) assert that there is a positive correlation between those two entities. This is explained by the fact that investors tend to concentrate their trading at the same time in order to benefit from a greater liquidity. Similarly, Gregoriou et al. (2005) foresaw the same kind of relation. However, Lin et al. (1995) maintain that the trading volumes imply an adverse selection problem as the informed investors prefer to negotiate important volumes in order to take advantage from their information. So the rise of the trading volumes brings about disequilibrium in the market and leads to extra costs that have to be recouped by the enlargement of the spread. This variable is measured by the annual average of the trading volumes. We, then, expect the relationship between the spread and the trading volumes to be negative.
Price volatility : Barnea and Logue (1975) and Stoll (1978) show that volatility affects inventory holding costs and risk of stock management. It is positively associated with bid-ask spreads. Heflin et al. (2005) prove a negative relationship between liquidity and the volatility of prices. Volatility is measured by the annual average of the standard deviation of equity returns. We expect the relationship between bid-ask spreads and volatility to be positive.
Share Price : The microstructure of financial markets stipulates that the price explains a significant part of the liquidity of shares. While some authors have shown that share price is positively associated with levels of liquidity (Dennis and Weston, 2001, Attig et al., 2006) , others advocate a negative relationship between the price of shares and their liquidity (Heflin et al., 2005) .This variable is measured by the average of the daily closing prices of each year.
We expect a negative relationship between share price and bid-ask spreads.
Firm size : It is considered as a proxy of information asymmetry and agency costs. Demsetz (1968) suggests that small companies incur high level of information asymmetry. Moreover, equities firms with weak market capitalization are less liquid (Chiang and Venkatesh, 1988, Laux, 1993) . Consequently, we anticipate a positive association between firm size and bid-ask spreads. It is measured by the natural logarithm of year-end market capitalization.
Listing in the U.S Market :
The listing on overseas investments, and more particularly in U.S. markets, is considered as one of the essential characteristics that may influence the decision of publication. Indeed, when a company is publicly listed on U.S. markets, it must comply with the requirements of these markets and publish its accounts under U.S.GAAP. El-Gazzar et al.
(1999), Lins et al. (2005) and Botosan (2006) argue that trading on more than one market is among the reasons that may motivate leaders to become more inclined to inform the market.
The application of these standards and subsequently the higher level of published information is perceived as a positive signal by the market, thereby increasing confidence among investors. This is likely to attract investors to invest in these companies, thus increasing the volume of transactions. We expect a positive association between listing on the U.S. market and liquidity. 
Methodology
To test the relation between corporate governance and liquidity, we utilize the regression models in Table 2 .
After we have considered the effects of the global corporate governance index on liquidity (Model 1), we would like to examine the separate effects of the different determinants of corporate governance ( the retained sub-indexes) on market liquidity (see : Model 2, Model 3,
Model 4 and Model 5).
It is therefore interesting to examine the extent to which each determinant affects liquidity.
Tab 2. Models
Model 1 :
Model 4 :
Our methodology relies on a pooled regression approach. We apply a logistic transformation for financial variables (Quoted and Effective Relative Spread, trading volume, share price and volatility) to convert bounded variables to unbounded ones.
The relation between corporate governance and liquidity is estimated using the fixed effects panel regression. This method accounts for potential endogeneity of corporate governance measures by controlling for potential unobservable firm-specific factors that could be driving both firm liquidity and corporate governance (Semykina and Wooldridge, 2010) . Moreover, the results of Hausman (1978) test reveal that the fixed effect is preferred.
IV. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
In this section, we examine how our corporate governance indexes are related to our liquidity measures. Table 3 illustrates the descriptive statistics of the global index as well as the sub-indexes. We notice that the governance index is on average in the order of 51.01 %. This leaves us to note that the French companies of our sample in terms of quality are above average. However, it is necessary to bring improvements in order to have a better governance quality. We also observe that the higher index is that of the disclosure of information. The transparency seems to be one of the major priorities of the French regulation that would aim to the safeguard of the investors' security. In other words, all these scores display relatively low standard deviation. This implies that the French companies are aware of the importance of these mechanisms impact on the quality governance system. It seems also that the criterion of the governance efficiency of our sample do not have the same importance and effect differently the governance quality.
Descriptive statistics
We also note that the displayed price spread is on average equal to 0.81% while we observe a lower one in the Anglo-Saxon markets. In fact, Heflin et al. (2005) found out that the price spread in North-America is in the order of 0.162% . Sarin et al. (2000) set the level of the spread to an average of 0.012 in the United States. Consequently, we consider that the French financial market is less liquid than the Anglo-Saxon markets.
Tab 3. Descriptive statistics
This table illustrates the descriptive statistics of different indexes. Ind_glob: Global index of the corporate governance quality, Ind_conse: board of directors index, Ind_aud: Index of the audit committee, Ind_actio:index of the ownership structure, Ind_divul: index of the transparency and the disclosure of information. Table 4 shows that the selected governance index affects, in a negative way, the displayed spread. Consequently, it may be deduced that the corporations adopting a big number of recommendations implemented in the items selected for the measurement of governance quality proved to have a better market liquidity. The higher is the index, the more liquid are the stock liquidity. Generally speaking, this confirms that good governance allows lowering the degree of uncertainty concerning the corporate stocks of our sample. When evaluating the governance quality and the choice of investment, the potential investors and the market take into consideration the efficiency of all mechanisms and not only a single attribute. This result is coherent with the former modelings as well as confirms the one found out by Chung et al. (2010) , Chung et al. (2010) and Charoenwong et al. (2011) . These latter have shown that a governance index increase of 1%, is, on average, associated to 1.2 % increase in the transactions volume. Moreover, we have also ran regressions using the sub-indexes with regard to the four governance axes; namely the board of directors' characteristics, the audit, the ownership structure, and the disclosure of information. The examination of the effect of the governance sub-indexes on the liquidity corroborates the result of the global governance index. However, this is not the case for the ownership structure index which reveals a nonsignificant coefficient. This might indicate that the board of directors' sub-indexes, the audit and the disclosure of information are the key elements that arouse the investor's interest when conducting a transaction. The type and nature of the ownership structure might be interesting for the positions on the long term, yet they do not influence the market liquidity of our sample.
Ind_GOV Ind_conse
Results and discussion
The link between the transactions volume and the price spread is negative and statistically significant to a level of 1%. This means that higher transactions volume would entail both weaker shares detention and information research costs and more liquid the market will be.
The intensity of the activity that the transactions volume measures is usually displayed in the bid/ask spread as this activity determines the risk level covered by the investors in terms of inventory of trading stock. In fact, the transactions volume is often associated with the operators increased ability to execute transaction with little impact on the price. These transactions, in their turn, alleviate the risk linked to the conservation of stocks and so to narrow the interbank bid/ask spread. This result is in compliance with predictions of Chae (2005) and Heflin et al. (2005) .
The volatility of prices influences positively and in a significant way the stock spread.The rise of the volatility and of the profitability of an asset increase the probability to negotiate with an informed investor. The investors will tend to increase the bid price and decrease the ask one.
This would entail both the widening of the price spread and the reduction of liquidity. And here, the result is in compliance with the observations of Espinosa et al. (2008) .
The variable coefficient « price of the security » is negative and significant. This result indicates that stocks with low trading have larger price spreads. This relation depends, to a large extent, on the cost of the processing of payment orders. These costs are regressive to the price as they are allocated on a bigger amount of currency units for the high price shares (Stoll, 1978) .
Tab 4. Regressions Results
LnBASPA : is the neperian logarithm of the displayed price spread ; Ind_glob, Ind_conse, Ind_aud, Ind_actio, Ind_divul are respectively: global index, board of directors index, audit index, ownership structure index and quality of information disclosure index ; LNVOLM: is the neperian logarithm of the transactions volume annual average ; LnCB: is the firm size measured by neperian logarithm of the market capitalization annually at the end of December ; VOLT : is the annual average of the standard deviation of the daily returns ; LnPRICE: is the average stock price for each year daily closing USCOT : equal to 1 if the firm is listed in the American markets ; if not 0. This result converges towards the idea claiming that smaller capitalization firms are less liquid than highly capitalized one. This observation coincides with LaFond et al. (2007) earlier findings. Concerning the American market, the pricing variable is negatively associated with the price spread. This result confirms the listed companies in the American market publish more informative annual reports. These companies adopt the US GAAP. These latter are more demanding in terms of information; which explains the positive effect on the liquidity of stocks. The distinction between the IFRS and the US GAAP is meaningful due to the literature awareness of their different influence on investors in terms of informational value (Bischof and Daske, 2013) .
V. CONCLUSION
This paper contributes to the literature by conducting an empirical test of the effect of corporate governance characteristics on the liquidity of French companies. While prior literature generally suggests that the level of liquidity has an impact on corporate governance mechanisms, the empirical evidence regarding the impact of corporate governance characteristics on firm's market liquidity is quite limited (Edmans, 2009) . Or, prior research suggests that companies with poor governance structure have lower market values (Chung et al., 2010) . There is a thought that poorly protected shareholder, as in the French context, result in less important cash flows to shareholders. So, firms with better corporate governance are likely to have liquid markets for their shares because effective corporate governance increases financial transparency, which eventually decreases information asymmetries.
In this study, we have measured a set of variables of corporate governance and market liquidity for 287 companies. The set of information required to this measure has been collected between 2007 and 2012.
Our results show that, in a setting characterized by high ownership concentration and after controlling for its level, better corporate governance practices tend to improve market liquidity in terms of quoted spread, which confirms that the market believes that such indicators help to evaluate the risk of information asymmetry. This proves that good governance tends to reduce uncertainty in the securities of companies in our sample.
We have also shown that it is principally the sub-indices of the board, audit and disclosure of information that are of interest to investors when conducting a transaction. The nature and type of ownership can be interesting for long-term positions, but does not influence liquidity.
This paper seems to be one of the rare studies that have examined the direct relationship between the quality of the corporate governance and the liquidity of firms. Our conclusions would have important implications in terms of the academics understanding of the advantages and the cost of the corporate governance. Moreover, they would also permit to put into perspective other researchers' comments who suggested that an amelioration of the corporate governance quality curbs the liquidity of stocks (Bhide, 1993, Bolton and Thadden, 1998) .
